THE New Republic

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*An Editorial*

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# Kennan and Kennanism

*The Case Against Disengagement*

By JAMES E. KING, JR.

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Bang the Drum Slowly . . . . . *Robert Evett*

TO TEST OR NOT TO TEST

*A Critique of Edward Teller's "Our Nuclear Future" by a Fellow Scientist*

APRIL 7, 1958

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# Washington Wire

## Congress Goes Home

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV is now unchallenged boss. He's taken Stalin's job without bloodbaths—which shows his confidence. It's hard to look anywhere in the world today for bright spots for the US. Communism has the initiative, the propaganda advantage. America has worthy ideals; they're obscured. We're on the defensive. At home, on the economic front, our production slumps while Soviet production rises. Will this dreary prospect continue? We hope not. Is this necessary? No. What's the cause? Well, let's not be unfair. But in all candor, which of the world's two great rival spokesmen today has the more drive, the more imagination, the more executive vigor—Khrushchev or our man?

Congress goes home for Easter recess April 4-14, and the interval will probably decide whether we get a tax cut. Congressmen, facing election this fall, are going to be told about the recession at first hand in their local constituencies, and will come back raring to go. When they return we'll have two major statistics—March production and March unemployment.

Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson has done a remarkable job in whipping legislation through Congress. He's gone out deliberately to meet possible GOP charges that this is a do-nothing Congress. He has created an image of a dynamic Democratic legislature contrasted to a lethargic Republican executive. Considering his small Democratic majority and the split in the party, his feat is astonishing.

But this should be noted. The Johnson program is mostly repetitive. "Anything you can do," he tells the GOP, "I can do better." He pushes through great sums, fast. He is ready with more help, more quickly, for larger segments of the voters (including the farmers). But there are few new ideas. New social legislation? No. A new civil rights bill? Heavens, no! Federal aid to school construction?—that's forgotten. Johnson's drive, like the GOP's, is against highway overcrowding, not school overcrowding. He would favor a Texas natural gas bill if he could get it. It's significant, too, that Johnson and other top Democrats opposed the Neuberger anti-billboard amendment to the highway bill; a sentimental matter, Johnson considers it, whether the public sees the scenery so long as highways are built.

Johnson's policies aid the Democrats in the mid-term election this fall. But they are short-term. He stands on a hill, not a mountain. The great liberal, former Senator Herbert Lehman of New York, now 80, last week challenged the wisdom of the Democrats in letting Johnson and his friends shape the party's issues for the 1960 Presidential election.

## Let Uncle Sam Do It

THIS REPORTER frequently asks himself how the leaders of the auto industry could have gone so terribly wrong about forecasting consumer demand. Anybody can now see that the "Edsel" was doomed to be a flop, that the public was sick and tired of over-ornamented, overpriced cars. The center of today's recession is Detroit, radiating out into steel, rubber, lacquer and other industries and now threatening to feed on itself.

In 10 years, 1947-56, GM's boss, Harlow Curtice, got bonuses of $3.92 million in addition to salary of $1.63 million; 60 top GM officers and directors averaged bonuses of $163,000 apiece in 1956. These men are paid well to know the public's wants; yet they, like Ford and Chrysler, miserably misjudged them. It is the Rambler and small foreign cars that are selling as the buyers' strike against big four-eyed gas hogs goes on.

And what is Detroit's answer to the problem? Let the government bail them out. The going has got rough, and Curtice wants a tax cut. He was among the first to advocate it, getting his plea in to a Congressional committee, January 30. Congress is likely to assent, too. There is a 10 percent federal excise tax on autos, amounting to $150 to $300 per car. Drop that as an "anti-recession" measure and people might start buying cars again. As for cutting its own prices, free-enterprise Detroit blanches at the thought. Let Uncle Sam do it.

Some prices are being cut, to be sure. Aluminum, for instance. The price cut, this Tuesday, will be the first since 1941. Very statesmanlike, you observe. Want to know how it came about? Alcoa, Reynolds Metals and the others cut prices because Canada's Aluminium Ltd. cut prices. And the Canadian company cut because Russian aluminum came into the British market at 1 or 2 cents a pound below the Canadian quotation. That's why we get it cheaper.

## Conspicuous Silence

REP. ABRAHAM MULTER (D, N.Y.) put into the *Congressional Record* an article, "The Conspicuous Silence of Business Leaders," by Donald I. Rogers of the *New York Herald-Tribune*. Rogers calls on Roger Blough, Harlow Curtice, David Sarnoff, Keith Funston, saying we need their advice now. "Eighteen months ago [you] were telling the people that if it were not for the free enterprise system they would not be having it so good," he says. Pleads Rogers—don't you see that in your silence now is "the quiet assumption of blame for the recession?"

Fortunately the nation has Philip Talbott, the new head of the US Chamber of Commerce. "I sort of shy away from that word 'recession'," he told a Philadelphia audience. "It sounds a little mealy-mouthed to me." Unmealy-mouthed Talbott warned against "federal education," unions and high income taxes in the upper brackets, and said "unemployment" is "highly exaggerated" and only hitting "a small percentage."

## Notes

THE "WHOLE US scientific community was injured" by the way Oppenheimer was dismissed, Wernher von Braun, "Explorer" satellite engineer, told a Congressional committee; "the British would have knighted him!" . . . And Senator Barry Goldwater (R, Ariz.) still thinks Walter Reuther "more dangerous than the Soviet Sputnik." . . . Ho-hum.

**T.R.B.**

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# Correspondence

► *Homer Nodded*

SIRS:

HOMER nodded, so it's permissible for your usually impeccable TRB to lapse occasionally. This he did in your March 10 issue when he referred to Judge *Newbold* Morris as counsel to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. TRB had in mind, of course, "Judge"

*(Continued on page 24)*

# Power of the Police

As Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are now written, the police must take anyone they arrest "without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States." When taken before a commissioner, the defendant is informed of the charge against him, of his right to counsel, his right to stand mute, and his right to a preliminary examination. Needless to say, he will not be held if the police fail to show probable cause of his guilt. If there is probable cause, he is given an opportunity to consult counsel and, save in exceptional cases, is admitted to bail.

Not infrequently, the police, in their zeal or obtuseness, or both, or because they have made an arrest based on suspicion rather than the required probable cause, fail to arraign the accused before a commissioner "without unnecessary delay." Characteristically, the period of the delay is spent in intensive questioning of the suspect, and sometimes the result is a confession. For many years now, the federal courts have been holding confessions thus obtained by means that violate the procedure prescribed by law inadmissible in evidence against the accused when he is brought to trial. And so the Supreme Court held last June in the capital case of one Mallory, who was charged with rape in Washington.

However, a House Judiciary Subcommittee has now reported out a bill aimed at preventing confessions otherwise admissible from being held inadmissible in evidence "solely because of delay in taking an arrested person before a commissioner." The bill is either ineffective, working no perceptible change in the present law properly understood; or, and this is less likely, it does effect a change, and if so a most unfortunate one.

The courts have interpreted the phrase "without unnecessary delay" to mean what it says: they have not outlawed all delays nor all questioning or quick checking of evidence prior to arraignment. And when a confession extracted before arraignment has been excluded, it has always been in light of all the circumstances in a case, and seldom if ever "solely" because of the unnecessary delay. In the Mallory case itself there was a whole set of aggravating circumstances, not the least striking of which is the fact that Mallory's mental capacity was such that his trial was delayed for a year before a determination could be made that he was able to understand the proceedings against him! On this analysis, it would follow that the House bill with its "solely" clause will make no significant change. It will simply confuse things a bit, perhaps tend to invite lawless police action that the courts will then have to deal with all over again, and ultimately provide another textbook example of futile and essentially immoral—because irresponsible—legislation.

But if this analysis should prove wrong, damage will have been done to some very important principles. As the Court explained through Mr. Justice Frankfurter 15 years ago in the famous McNabb case, the principle

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at issue here is that "the awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary," that is, to the police alone. "The complicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility for which is separately vested in the various participants. . . . " What is at stake is "an important safeguard—not only in assuring protection for the innocent but also in obtaining conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselves to a progressive and self-confident society."

Let those who would be satisfied to trust "a single functionary" ponder the statement before a Senate subcommittee of Edgar E. Scott, chief of detectives in Washington, D. C. People who support the present law, he said, must have some "selfish motive." For: "One of the first acts of persons seeking to overthrow the government would be to break down law enforcement" —that is to say, change or supervise or control the ways of Mr. Scott with suspects he pulls in. It may be said that a man of Mr. Scott's severely limited understanding and obviously unbridled temper is not fit to be a police officer. That is true, but there he is, and it cannot be that he is quite alone, or that the likes of him are forever safely avoidable.

# Mr. Gromyko's Timing

THE SMILING gentleman who commutes from Washington to Gettysburg told his press conference last June that he,

> would be perfectly delighted to make some satisfactory arrangement for temporary suspension of tests while we could determine whether we couldn't make some agreements that would allow it to be a permanent arrangement.

He might have been delighted, but his "advisors" who decide these matters in Washington were not. They did not then want, nor have they ever wanted, a ban on nuclear testing. They had their excuses: No test ban, said they, could be enforced. When the absurdity of that argument became too apparent, they added that perhaps a ban *could* be enforced but it would require aerial and ground inspection unacceptable to the Russians. Then, after the Russians said on June 15, 1957, that they *would* be willing to consider the monitoring of a test ban by international inspection teams, the Administration retreated to the unprepared position that inspection was not after all enough—the Soviets must also suspend production of fissionable material.

This evasive and deceitful dodging has gone on for a long, long time, and when Adlai Stevenson suggested nearly two years ago that we should face the fact that the Russians too were making progress in nuclear armaments and that an end to testing at that time would be to our national advantage, he was practically accused of serving Moscow. We *must* continue testing, said the Administration; there is always something more to be learned.

Last week we learned from Mr. Gromyko that the Russians intend to suspend further testing on their own. They invite us and the British to go and do likewise. It was a brilliant political move, even in an era when almost anything reasonably astute looks brilliant by comparison with the sleepwalking that passes for American diplomacy.

The Russians, understandably, are themselves now "perfectly delighted" to rest awhile on the high ground that they have won, for it is reliably reported that they have conducted 50 nuclear tests, 14 in the nine months since the break-up of the London disarmament talks, including the long series just completed in which they tested warheads for their rockets. The timing of the Gromyko announcement was perfect, coming just before the US begins a lengthy series of new nuclear tests.

What can be done? It is not pleasant to say, but our answer is: Nothing substantial while this Administration remains in office. But as for what should be done? A frank and uncomplicated reply to the Gromyko announcement on test suspensions would:

Welcome it.

Point out that the tests we are about to run are similar in purpose to those the Russians have just finished, and that we intend to carry on as planned in the absence of any mutually-acceptable plan for controlling testing.

Announce our desire to begin negotiating an agreement to cease all further nuclear tests for two years, this agreement to be monitored by UN inspection teams based on US and Soviet soil, and agreeing to divorce this issue from that of the production of fissionable material.

Ask the Soviet Union to join us in the UN Disarmament Commission to negotiate not merely methods for assuring an end to nuclear testing, but the internationally-supervised elimination of all nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all nations.

# Well, There, Of Course...

*John Herling* of Editors Syndicate—Mr. President, many Senators and Congressmen are concerned about the possible adverse effect on their community of the renewal of the reciprocal trade agreement legislation in general. However, many of them believe they could vote for the renewal of such an important measure if there were less stress and strain and less opposition back home, if an amendment were added in the form of a trade adjustment act, which would aid labor and industry and generally, communities which might be adversely affected by the operations of the reciprocal trade legislation.

Is there any prospect that you and the Administration

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would support such an amendment of the Reciprocal Trade Act?

*A*—Well, I believe already, the only amendment I can think would be more useful was that you could go back to 50 percent above the 1934 tariff levels in order to protect their particular industry when there was clear evidence that it was being threatened. Now, I don't know of any other amendment that we have thought of, and I don't know what you could be thinking of.

*Q*—Well, sir . . . there is legislation introduced which—

*A*—Yes?

*Q*—Which would physically and economically aid communities that might be adversely affected.

*A*—Oh, you mean direct, some kind—

*Q*—Direct subsidy, yes.

*A*—Well, whatever you can—

*Q*—The Randall Commission report, for example.

*A*—Well, there, of course, there has been all sorts of things suggested even to the degree of assisting a small industry that wants to go into something else, and giving it federal help while it gets going on something that's more profitable for it, and all sorts of things, and none of them as far as I know have been written into legislation. But there is, of course, all of this concern about the so-called depressed areas by giving greater intensity to your procurement efforts in those areas, wherever you can. Everything of that kind has been done that I know of, but I have—but the idea you are now propounding, I don't—

*Q*—If specific legislation were laid out, would you consider it?

*A*—I would have to take a look at it.

— *From the transcript of the President's press conference on Wednesday, March 26.*

DEPUTY Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon went to see Sherman Adams last week to make a few modest arrangements for White House backstopping in the Congressional showdown on reciprocal trade. He asked that the President telephone House Minority Leader Joseph Martin and Minority Whip Charles Halleck to pin down their support. Adams replied that the President was making his views known in his March 27 speech before a pro-trade rally in Washington and that he could not be bothered with personal "lobbying."

That Adams shielded the General from his principal lieutenant in the trade fight is not insidious, of course, for the President himself is quite candid about his reluctance to pressure Congress. But the influence which the President can, if he wishes, bring to Congressional decisions has seldom been so crucial as it is in this instance of the trade fight. The outcome may be decided by a few votes.

If President Eisenhower would support the so-called Trade Adjustment Act, for example, the necessary votes could probably be mustered for extension of the reciprocal trade agreement in the House. Yet, as is clear from the exchange quoted above, the President seems totally unaware of the well-publicized campaign by many members of Congress to cushion the domestic effects of the extension of reciprocal trade through subsidies to critically affected industries. (To the embarrassment of reporters the President confused the Trade Adjustment Act with federal aid to depressed areas suffering from the recession.) If Sherman Adams won't, someone should tell the President what Rep. Richard Bolling (D, Mo.) told the trade rally last week: that extension of our reciprocal trade agreements cannot be counted on without "the concerted and persistent efforts of the President and his Administration."

# Senator Bowles?

IF DEMOCRATIC prospects were poor this year, Chester Bowles would not have two rivals (one of them his old partner, William Benton) for the Democratic Senatorial nomination in Connecticut. But the fact that the Democratic nomination for Senator is presently worth a great deal in 1958 also lends importance to reports that Bowles is given a good chance to defeat Benton and former Congressman Thomas J. Dodd at the Connecticut Democratic Convention.

The decision of the convention, scheduled for June 27-28 in Hartford, will in all probability be the decision of Democratic State Chairman John M. Bailey and Governor Ribicoff. Mr. Bailey, an unusually shrewd Democratic organization leader, is expected to come down on Bowles' side for some highly practical reasons: Not only can Mr. Bowles claim significant bloc support (*e.g.* New Haven) within Connecticut Democratic ranks; more decisive is his prestige nationally and internationally. As a member of the Senate—should he defeat the unimpressive Republican incumbent, William Purtell—he would quickly become a leading figure among Democratic internationalists. His experience as wartime price administrator and Governor of Connecticut, as well as his record as Ambassador to India, assures that he would be heard with a respect not often accorded freshman Senators. Talk of Mr. Bowles as a Presidential dark horse would be heard again.

It is an unpleasant necessity to compare Bowles with Benton, himself a distinguished public figure. But Benton in this instance appears to have lost his sense of proportion. Despite an expensive campaign he has gained no substantial political support. Former Democratic Governor Wilbert Snow called on Benton and Bowles last week to combine forces, which is, perhaps, what Mr. Bailey is waiting for. Benton will, we hope, withdraw as soon as possible in Bowles' favor.

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# The Bargaining Begins

PERHAPS it is symbolic that negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement between GM and the UAW began on April Fool's Day. At any rate what comes out may be a not too pleasant surprise to a working group conditioned to continuous prosperity.

For the union leaders negotiating the upcoming agreements—the UAW contracts with the other auto manufacturers expire very shortly after GM's—will do so under circumstances unlike any they have experienced since the period 20 years ago when GM was organized and the first agreement signed. Since 1940, economic conditions at agreement-making time have consistently been on the upswing; the 1948 contract was signed before the recession of that year developed, and the 1955 contract came after the 1954 drop-back had turned into the biggest of automobile years. The union formula has been to obtain for more workers a larger yield from an expanded output, and the record shows its success; in 1937, hourly earnings of production workers throughout the automobile industry averaged 87 cents; the 1957 figure was $2.47. Even in the last 10 years, the number of workers covered under the UAW's GM contract has grown from 225,000 to 375,000.

But now, with the transportation-equipment industry close to the top in numbers of unemployed, with production schedules running 38 percent under a year ago, with a 90-day inventory of unsold new models on hand, and with reliable consumer surveys indicating that only 6.5 percent of the country's families plan to buy a new car this year as compared with 8 to 9 percent in recent times, the UAW is dealing with a difficult and a different situation.

Demands for improvements in workers earnings from sources that would add to costs are certain to be sharply combatted; this goes far to explain Walter Reuther's proposal of a plan for profit-sharing, to take new gains from earnings that are already realized.

What happens at GM will be all the more closely watched because the big contracts always serve as economic weather vanes, and there are relatively few big ones coming up for renewal this year. In the country as a whole, there are some 329 union-management contracts covering 5,000 or more workers; some of these expired last year and are still being renegotiated, but of the 266 in force on January 1, 1958, only 120 were renewable during the year, and of these, 33 were in transportation equipment.

In more personal terms, the more than a million workers affected under the up-coming agreements number around one in six of the workers covered by contracts involving more than 5,000; they are likewise a not inconsiderable fraction of the approximately 18 million who work under collective bargaining of any sort.

Seated at a bargaining table under today's conditions, perhaps the most desirable of all contract provisions, from the UAW point of view, may be a short term. In the recent past, the trend has been the other way. Of the 266 contracts with fixed terms in effect now, 92 run for three years as compared with only 11 one-year agreements. (The expiring contracts are in the three-year class.)

But a one-year contract this time would serve two purposes. It would provide for a new look at a time when the recession will almost certainly have completed its down-swing. And it would bring the UAW termination dates even with the Steel Workers'.

Over the years, there has been a neck-and-neck rivalry as to which of these two unions could do best for its members. In 1940, average hourly earnings of auto production workers, excluding overtime, were 92.7 cents; steel workers got 83 cents. In 1946, when the war was over, the differential was $1.368 for autos, $1.292 for steel. By 1952, the difference was down to one-tenth of a cent; in 1953, the steel workers forged ahead with $2.134 as compared with $2.119. Last year, steel was $2.682 and autos $2.430.

So both in terms of the state of the economy and in terms of inter-union rivalry, Walter Reuther may prove to be more interested in duration than in content during the contract-making now about to start.

# Judge Kaufman's Rise

IT ISN'T easy and it isn't pleasant to attempt to put one's finger on precisely what is wrong with the prospective promotion of Judge Irving R. Kaufman, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, to the United States Court of Appeals in New York. The matter is of some importance. A shorthand way of indicating why the appointment is disturbing would be to say: the death sentence in the espionage prosecution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

The Rosenberg case to the side, Mr. Kaufman has been an undistinguished judge; not inadequate, just undistinguished, even indistinguishable. What has brought him to notice, what has placed news of his promotion on the front page of the *New York Times*, what no doubt commends him to his staunch supporter, Sen. Styles Bridges of New Hampshire (but what commends him to his other sponsors, Senator Kefauver and Representative Celler?)—in sum, the reason for his preferment is the unprecedented death sentence he saw fit to impose, after some rather public soul-searching and prayer, on Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

No doubt there had been a just verdict in the Rosenberg case, though the heightened atmosphere in which it was tried gave cause for uneasiness. But the ferocity of the sentence—and sentences are in our system virtually

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unreviewable by higher courts—reflected no credit on American administration of justice.

Perhaps even in these calmer times it is too early to expect popular contrition about the episode. Moreover, the sentence cannot be called a miscarriage of justice, since there is little doubt of the Rosenbergs' guilt, and not much doubt that the sentence, albeit in practice shockingly exceptional, was lawful under the applicable statute. But to commemorate it, to honor the sentence by honoring a man whose only claim to distinction it is—that is callous almost to the point of indecency.

# Nasser's Double Victory

COLONEL NASSER has just won a double victory which necessitates a sharp change in US Middle Eastern policy. Within 24 hours he eliminated two of his most dangerous rivals and brought himself closer still to realizing his dream as the Bismarck of Arab unity.

On March 23 Nasser accepted the resignation of General Bizri, former Commander in Chief of the Syrian Army and the last survivor of the pro-Communist triumvirate which was steadily increasing its power in Syria before the creation of the United Arab Republic. (The other two, Khalid Baqdash, the brilliant young leader of the Syrian Communist Party, and the deputy Prime Minister, Khaled al Azm, were removed from their positions just as soon as the Syrian-Egyptian union was formed.)

Bizri's resignation also consolidates Nasser's personal control of the Syrian Army—its other leaders, including the formidable Chief of Intelligence Colonel Sarraj, were given civilian jobs in the new administration. It was Bizri who during the crisis between Turkey and Syria last autumn organized the Home Guard which some Western commentators saw as the tool for a Communist *coup d'etat*. Bizri's resignation now makes Nasser's control of Syria complete. And, at least until after Nasser's coming visit to Moscow it is hard to see what can prevent consolidation of Syria into the United Arab Republic.

In Saudi Arabia, however, the US need not be so impotent. On March 24 King Saud of Arabia published a decree handing full power over his kingdom's foreign, internal and economic affairs to his brother, Crown Prince Emir Faisal, who was already Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

The reason which has most often been given is King Saud's failure to rebut accusations that he financed an attempt to assassinate Colonel Nasser; thus throughout the Arab world Faisal's rise is seen as a major triumph for Egypt. But this interpretation may be too simple. King Saud's decadent way of life and the corruption of his court have led to growing unrest in recent years. Despite colossal oil revenues, there has been no improvement in the living standards of the average Arabian, and the country has been so far totally unresponsive to the revolutionary social challenge which has begun to transform the other Arab states.

On the death of Saud's venerated father, the unifier of Arabia, a group of young, literate Saudis in the Army, the government bureaucracies and the urban middle class organized an underground—the Saudi Reform Movement. Instead of instituting reforms, Saud called out the tribal levies and gave power to the religious reactionaries. Wholesale expulsion of Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese accompanied by numerous executions of Saudis failed to bring to a halt the growth of the Reform Movement.

However, when Saud's dispute with Britain over the Buraimi oasis and his Southern boundary led him to finance—with his oil dollars—Nasser's political drive against Britain in Jordan and Syria, Nasser's (and the Communists') support of Saud as a loyal and valued ally in the struggle against imperialism persuaded most of the members of the Saudi Reform Movement to remain silent.

Despite Saud's efforts to save Hussein in Jordan and his flirtations with Iraq, Nasser did not move until Saud's oil dollars could no longer be effective in Syria. When his propaganda machine finally attacked Saud, however, Saud's days of independence were numbered. This fact was recognized in Saudi Arabia if not in Washington and, to appease Nasser, Faisal was given control of the government. (Whether by prior agreement or not is immaterial; Nasser ceased his attacks on Saud on the same day.)

With full powers over internal (including the Army), foreign and financial policies, Prince Faisal has become the only man with whom we can deal. But Faisal cannot, as we asked his brother Saud to do, implement what currently passes for US Middle East policy. He does not have the necessary support in Saudi Arabia to risk it if he were willing. All our efforts should be to aid and encourage Faisal to institute the reforms that will bring him such support and that will in turn free him from dependence on Nasser.

For Faisal to consolidate his power he must not only eliminate his dependence on his Royal brothers and the tribes with whom they are allied through their mothers and wives but also his dependence on the religious fanatics on whom his brother leaned. To rely on them will mean absolute dependence on Nasser. The Reform Movement and the rich merchants of the Hedjaz can form the basis of sound support for progressive reform. The sympathy and active encouragement of the US (particularly an open-mindedness to what progressive Saudis feel are inequities in the Arabian-American Oil Company's policies and practice) may be the essential element in persuading Faisal to risk reform and independence rather than the status quo as Nasser's satellite.

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# American Culture
# In Search of Angels—III

AMONG the cultural institutions which have altered their financing methods as the bulk of American wealth has come to be located in the middle-income brackets, the colleges and universities, with their recent plans for annual alumni giving, rank high.

In the old days, the financing of such institutions was considered to be the job of the president and board of trustees; they were the ones who had to convince the legislature in the case of public institutions, or raise endowments from private sources in the case of private ones. And in case of a deficit, they were expected to examine their own consciences and their own checkbooks.

When the gold standard and the high interest rates of the days before the depression were solid-rock certainties, the endowments of private institutions were put into safe investments, and the portion of the budget that was not provided by student fees was based on endowment earnings. To provide dormitories, gymnasiums, lecture halls and professorial chairs, major gifts were sought from major donors, with the resulting facilities often bearing their names.

To meet rising costs under this formula, between the end of World War I and 1926, 68 major drives raised $149 million for higher education. But thereafter

—recent donors to endowment drives proved resentful of a repeat performance;
—depression reduced endowment income, and low interest rates continued after recovery;
—steepening income tax schedules reduced the number and the willingness of major donors.

So since World War II, universities are increasingly turning to their former students, and obtaining remarkably reliable current income in the form of annual giving through alumni funds.

The identification of the alumnus as a greenback-bearing animal goes back some years; it was made at Yale in 1890. Twenty years earlier, Yale professor William Sumner had forecast the breakthrough when he wrote:

> Many [graduates] can never pay the debt; a few can become munificent benefactors. There is a very large number, however, between these two, who can, and would cheerfully, give according to their ability in order that the college might hold the same relative position to future generations which it held to their own. The sense of gratitude, the sense of responsibility, the enlightened interest in the cause of education, which are felt by these men, constitute a source which has never yet been tried, but which would yield richly.

Thus in 1890, the Alumni University Fund Association circulated to Yale graduates a letter inviting "annual contributions which, continued from year to year as the majority of them are likely to be, will themselves form the income of what may be fairly deemed a permanent endowment and an income which can be immediately applied to current needs." By 1938, the rising curve of Yale's percent of alumni making annual gifts had reached 29, and the fund's dollar total $174,354; the rise has continued to 1956 totals of 46 percent and $1,514,068.

Since Yale pioneered, other colleges — public and private, men's, women's and co-ed—have joined the procession until in 1956, 398 such institutions reported annual funds with more than 4.5 million alumni solicited, 946,581 of them successfully. The year's total take from alumni gifts to annual funds was $34,665,058.

Solicitation of alumni has also attracted the interest of their sisters and their cousins and their aunts, and even their rich uncles. Non-alumni gifts to annual funds in 1956 added more than $12 million to those from alumni.



With this total of nearly $47 million a year, recipient institutions have available an income equivalent to the earnings at five percent of an endowment not far below $1 billion. The extent to which annual gifts are consciously being substituted for endowment is underlined by the choice made at Vassar in 1949, between a $10 million endowment drive and stepping up the level of annual giving to $350,000; the decision in favor of the latter was made because, in the words of the Fund director, $350,000 was "roughly the equivalent of the $10 million which we then would never have to raise."

As yet, top billing among alumni funds is concentrated in the Ivy League. At Harvard, where David McCord is held largely responsible for his institution's top rank in the number of alumni contributors, the following limerick reflects the attention given to high participation:

> A Harvard alumnus named Swift
> By a headhunting native was biffed.
> The head was sent forward
> To David McCord
> It upped the per capita gift.

Princeton and Dartmouth are top rivals in percentage of effectiveness of solicitation—both passed the 70 percent mark in 1956—with Mount Holyoke close behind.

But the alumni fund idea has already spread far and wide. Ohio State University was exceeded only by Harvard and Yale in 1956 in the number of its alumni contributors, and the No. 1 spot in effective solicitation that year went to Wofford College, a Methodist college for men in Spartanburg, South Carolina, where a trustee, by offering $1,000 for every percentage point above 12

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in alumni participation, pushed the total to the national high of 74.4 percent. At the same time, in the same town, Converse College for Women offered $5,000 if 80 percent of the 700 alumnae in Spartanburg County contributed, ran its local participation up to 90.2 percent and its over-all total from 20.7 to 66.7.

Strong alumni funds are rapidly growing stronger at such major state universities as Michigan, Minnesota, Iowa State.

Yet annual giving could clearly be developed much further. In 1956, only one alumnus out of five solicited made a gift. His gift averaged $35.60. The colleges with alumni funds solicit only about 5 out of 12 of all college alumni in the country.

At present, actually, in colleges with annual funds, the sums given by alumni in the form of pledge payments from past endowment drives and in gifts from the 10-to-15 percent who are in a position to make larger donations just about equal the receipts from annual giving. As against $34,665,058 given through funds in 1956, gifts from living alumni not credited to annual funds totalled $34,300,306.

Somewhere in these totals, the bequest figures ought also to be considered. At the same time that each year's graduates are indoctrinated with the desirability of annual giving, most colleges now also urge alumni to provide one final gift by remembering alma mater in their wills. Bequests, trusts and annuities brought in $27.5 million to colleges with alumni funds in 1956.

☆

The extent to which the new technique of annual giving figures in the support of education is placed in perspective when all sources of income for this aspect of culture are compared. New estimates by the US Office of Education, covering changes in the sources of income for higher education during the 30 years 1923-4 to 1953-4, years during which the money raised for education increased by nearly tenfold, offer such a comparison:

| | *1923-4* | *1953-4* |
|---|---|---|
| Internal Sources chiefly student fees | 43.59 | 33.03 |
| Philanthropic Sources | | |
| private gifts and grants | 4.56 | 8.12 |
| endowment earnings | 13.63 | 5.41 |
| Public Sources | 38.22 | 53.44 |
| Dollar Totals | $298,626,008 | $2,356,506,044 |

For the private institutions alone, the 1955-6 figures show that of the $1.23 billion raised that year, 42.4 percent came from student fees, 20.8 percent from government, 10.4 percent from endowment earnings, 16.0 percent from gifts, and 10.4 from other sources. Annual giving is clearly not only here to stay; it is here to be expanded.

HELEN HILL MILLER

## PORTRAITS OF OUR CITIES — III

# Richmond

by PATRICK O'DONOVAN

JUST LIKE the thing at the center of a pearl, cities can grow so overlain with extraneous matter that it is hard to see them. It is not nacre, of course, but accretions of emotion and history. . . . And yet the mere fact that a city has a history does not guarantee this strange veiling.

Many men and women have died violently and recently in every corner of London, yet you do not walk the streets disturbed or particularly respectful. Thousands of traitors and saints and pickpockets and patriots have died with the full horror of a slow ceremonial death at Tyburn and on Tower Hill, and yet the awe does not quite come when you stand there.

Many years ago my father took me on a tour of Ireland. We went to Limerick. As tourists do today, we took a jaunting car and sat back while we were rattled round the city. We had a single-minded driver. He drove to blank walls where so many had been shot, to roofless barracks where so many had died fighting or in the flames, to cemeteries where cheap monuments, already worn, stood upon the graves of more men who died of the shooting.

To most people Limerick is probably an unexpectedly elegant place, still rich in fine houses and elaborate churches, charged, maybe, with memories of a long crescendo of drinking after a rugby match or the recollection of a hotel where the water was cold and the maid kept saying her rosary. To me it is the saddest of cities, haunted by the deaths in the rain of hundreds of young men. I could swear that there is something tragic still and forlorn in the air of the place.

Richmond is such another city. Its "history" seems barely over; it is the saddest place in America. Its central tragedy is still remembered and displayed. It cultivates and cherishes the memory of deaths as Limerick does and as do those terrible towns in the North of France whose monuments were swept away in the First War and which have been given cemeteries in their place. This

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PATRICK O'DONOVAN, *correspondent for the* London Observer, *has been in this country since 1955. This is the third in a series of portraits of our cities.*

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cultivation of death, this free embrace with tragedy, is the factor that sets such cities apart.

For many Richmond is probably only a place where there is a thriving tobacco industry and some sizable fortunes to be made. A tourist may remember it as the place where the food offered in public places appears to deny the existence of Southern cooking as a tolerable way of eating. It will almost certainly be remembered as the place in which you became maddeningly lost in a web of mean streets. And yet a stranger, particularly if his approach to the Civil War was a late and a romantic one, will almost certainly not be put off.

He may know that Richmond was never quite a Bath or that Richmond under siege was no eve of Waterloo Ball. He may determinedly recall the confusion, the jealousy, and even the squalor of Confederate politics, and yet the image of elegant and light-hearted courage,

of a city which has been set apart by tragedy will remain.

Indeed you could believe that Richmond never recovered from its destruction and blood letting at all. It has a withdrawn and muted air. Most of its streets look as if they had been laid out for a more solid lining of building. It is as if its citizens had only recently, bravely and in a hurry, got the place going after unimaginable disaster. The flimsy shops. The grotesque and sudden changes from solid respectability to Roman pride, to tourists (American) ordinary, to careless industrialism, to appalling, tin-patched slums, to wide streets where the shops seem only one brick and the electric wires strung across the streets and the sign boards tacked to anything that stands look like the hurried contrivance of military police in a recently liberated country. The place is a mixture of dignified old age and of a rawness that bespeaks both carelessness and poverty.

You get to Richmond through a surf of colonial nonsense. All white as snow and wearing electric signs, pillared and pedimented and dimly remembering Gibbs, the motels and the gas stations and the little steamy restaurants block the entrance from the North like a broken coral reef. Yet, inside, most of Richmond is tree-lined and plain and comfortably old-fashioned. It is a pleasing repetition of red brick and white wood. Street after street of small villas, Victorian at heart, withdrawn upon their lawns. It is placid. There is a refined self-discipline here and, even in the brash and casual shopping streets, a sort of virtue. The traffic flows gently between the lights, and people stroll as if all the afternoons were empty.

Its history is celebrated in a littering of statues. They are, for the most part, simple statues of men who failed and are still loved and still named without any military title. There are a few churches, rather bare and architecturally a little unsure of themselves. They look like Chapels of Ease in a fashionable London borough. Some of them hold for this place the sort of significance that Westminster Hall does for the English.

It contains one splendid and disappointing building and one that is humble and unforgettable. The first is, of course, Jefferson's Capitol. It commands from a private hill, very proud and cream-colored, looming over its trees and lamp posts in a quiet Anglican square. Its portico is overwhelming, offering a promise of Republican splendors. But the inside, though elaborate, is hardly more than cozy. Somehow you expect, in Virginia, cool halls where legislators who mind passionately about the state of their linen and of their first principles measure everything in terms of a special conservatism, one with both aristocratic and revolutionary origins. It is not so. It was unfair to expect it.

The architecture of their chambers is "chapel." The method of business is more intimate than that of an auction. The style is contemporary. Their preoccupations

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are considerably practical. The principles do not show.

The other monument is a thin-pillared mansion, meager in style, a place that might suit a successful Doctor or a well beneficed Vicar. It has its pretensions in a tall porch that runs across the front of the house, a porch to which the rest of the house seems an annex. But the porch is pressed against the backs of indifferent buildings and this undemanding house has been shouldered away into a corner.

This is the White House of the Confederacy. They would have been hard pressed to give a Washington cocktail party in it, let alone a pre-battle ball—with crinolines and dancing at arm's length. It is the place where Jefferson Davis watched the sand run out of the Confederate glass. Its rooms are small and ill-shaped. Its fireplaces are lushly Victorian, of the sort that irritate Americans when they find them still serving in the bedrooms of country hotels in England. The furniture is curved and mahogany and austerely upholstered in shiny leather with buttons. It would be a pleasant place to live in. You could cope without a servant, if your wife were used to working and you did not entertain above your station. But it is no longer a house, it is a museum and a monument.

It has been made into a dusty ossuary crammed with relics. There are sacristies like this in France—the blood-stained chasuble and the dented chalice retrieved from the Revolution. Here there are torn flags, broken buckles, tarnished spoons, gray uniforms that great men wore to defeat, faded letters, badly cast medals, photographs turned bronze, swords, guns, watches, water bottles, Bibles and battle desks—the detritus of a surrender that was unconditional yet not humiliating.

The Boers have a place like this in Bloemfontein where they recall the war with the British. (It includes the vest of a small child shot, they say, by an English sentry, and a dangerous paper clip found by a female prisoner in her ration of bully beef—a fact that will surprise no one who knows his English rations.) There is another in Dublin. The Smithsonian and, in London, the Imperial War Museum have corners devoted to those kinds of memorabilia. They are a special sort of museum. They are intensely moving; they have been arranged by loving amateurs; the cases are overcrowded, heaped up with clothing that looks as if it were left out, hopelessly, for sale. And the cards have been penned, carefully and inaccurately, by devoted ladies.

Of course Richmond is more than this and for those that live there, far fuller and easier than a stranger's impressions. There are blocks of solid 19th Century town houses, with bulging fronts and windows and doors blinded with stained glass. There is a fragment of a Regency terrace where Mrs. Fitzherbert would have been at home. There is a hotel with a huge, mad, lobby that seems to have suffered from some surviving prohibition law and seems uncertain whether it is to be a Pantheon or a meeting place for the still living. There is a wealth of dotty classical architecture. There are soft, rotten places in among the quiet and unobtrusive streets which, on two stories, vie with Naples. No need to ask who lives there.

THE houses are built of brick, feverishly red. The windows are blind, though not with stained glass. There is no sign of anxiety here, or ambition, or fear for the future, or even the deep-set American expectation of a continually changing and expanding future. Only the cars parked outside assure you that this is not some shameful corner of Europe. You can tell the color of the inhabitants by the look of all but a very few streets. In Richmond the races have withdrawn into quarters that could be mapped with medieval exactitude. And that is an aspect of something else that restricts the stranger in Richmond.

You can take it on faith that here is a lively social and intellectual life. Writers live here. There is an art museum with the personality of a great ducal collection. There is an experimental theatre. There is a great hiving and swarming of literary teas. There is a nice to-ing and fro-ing between small drawing rooms. Life for the established citizen can be gentle and reasonably stimulating. But a stranger is more likely to encounter the Wall, the subject that may be listened to, but argued over only at the risk of intolerable bad manners on your side and stupefied anger on the other. The city is charming, and its sadness has a sweetness about it. But unless you are of it, it is not for you. There is a core of corroded iron here. You may understand how it got there. I do not see how you could enjoy it or live with it with any sort of ease.

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"ONE BATTLEGROUND where it is indisputably a good thing for the contestants to get as close as possible to the whites of each other's eyes," said *The Economist* last week, "is the present discussion about disengagement."

The controversy over proposals for East-West military withdrawals from a neutralized, mutually guaranteed and inspected zone in Central and Eastern Europe—increasing in intensity since George Kennan's Reith Lectures—is now the pivot of pre-Summit controversy on both sides of the Atlantic. In Britain advocacy of "disengagement" as a Western initiative at the Summit has become the major foreign policy plank of the Labour opposition. Influential public opinion not confined to parliamentary oppositions supports the Labour view in West Germany, Norway and Denmark. In the last three issues of *The New Republic,* Denis Healey, who shared in formulating the Labour position, has outlined his views in a special series which went on where Kennan left off. Here, and in next week's issue, the case against disengagement will be presented by Contributing Editor JAMES E. KING, JR.

Mr. King is a research associate at the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research and Vice President of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation. He served from 1947 to 1952 in the US occupation of Germany as Secretary General — later Deputy Chief of Staff — to US Military Governor Lucius D. Clay and as Executive Secretary to US High Commissioner John J. McCloy. From 1952 to 1957 he was a military operations analyst at the Operations Research Office, Washington, where he is still a consultant. His articles on national security policy have appeared in *Foreign Affairs* and other journals. Mr. King and Denis Healey were contemporaries (1937-39) at Balliol College, Oxford.

# Kennanism and Disengagement

by JAMES E. KING, JR.

> Armaments are important not just for what could be done with them in time of war, but for the psychological shadows they cast in time of peace. No one here has forgotten, I trust, the basic hostility borne us by world Communism . . . the cynical principles of political struggle, and the sharp, ruthless political tactics that have marked the Russian Communist movement since the moment of its inception. We know what we are up against. Let no one suppose that a recognition of the horrors of nuclear war is going to lead logically to a political and military capitulation on the Western side, any more than it will on the other.—GEORGE F. KENNAN, *Russia, the Atom and the West.*

THE PRIME strategic *reality* of our time, to appropriate George Kennan's favorite word, is that neither the potentiality of mobilizing superior military force, nor even the superiority of military force in being, can any longer be counted on to determine which of the great powers will prevail when their vital interests clash. This situation, the consequence of which is to place quite unprecedented burdens upon national determination and fortitude, became a reality the day that Sputnik I convinced the people of the NATO countries that the Russians must really have the intercontinental missiles they had been claiming.

This convinced our allies that we can no longer expect to win a war in which each side tried to overwhelm the other, for in such a war both sides would be destroyed. Also it means to them we shall find it difficult indeed to convince our adversary of our *intention* to use our nuclear force to initiate a suicidal total war. Consequently, our allies can no longer expect us to "win" our Cold War battles merely by virtue of what our nuclear armaments *could* do in a total war. But neither ought the Russians to be able to do so, for they cannot be sure our bombers are so obsolete or our missiles will be so slow in coming that they can destroy us before we destroy them.

This is to say that there is now no mistaking our

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arrival at that situation of "nuclear plenty," "nuclear parity," or "stalemate," which Churchill called "the balance of terror." We must hasten to add, however, that these terms, already clichés, hide the complexity of the situation they are meant to describe and convey an unfortunate impression of its stability. Last fall and winter, under the shock of the Sputniki, we in this country underwent a searching examination of our defenses. Every survey found them inadequate, but it was not always made clear what they were found to be inadequate for. Inevitably most people thought of their inadequacy in terms of our lost military advantage, assumed that the Russians must have gained a decisive lead over us, and hence that the task before us was to spend enough money and effort to regain the lead. Actually, with a few dissenting voices, the experts agreed that it was highly unlikely either that the Russians had in fact gained a lead or that we could ever overtake and leave them behind. All agreed that we could *fall behind* the Russians. But most thought and said that our maximum exertions were required only to keep abreast—to maintain "parity."

The nuclear "stalemate," then, is not a military balance that follows inevitably from the nature of nuclear armaments, nor one that maintains itself automatically. It is a prize we win by running hard just to keep up. And this must be so as long as our opponents are determined to set the pace. But there is an equally significant aspect of the situation that has been even more neglected. "Stalemate" is a state of mind; it is the moral consequence of the weapons balance, not the weapons "parity" itself. Consequently, the stalemate can be broken, or can fail of achievement, just as fatally by an inadequacy of moral response to the nuclear challenge as by failure of material effort.

Students of national military strategy in the nuclear age have for some years now been hammering away at a triple theme. When parity in nuclear destruction becomes a fact and not just a forecast, they said, we of the West shall face three deadly perils—quite apart from the possibility that we may not bestir ourselves to maintain parity (for some reason *this* seemed so improbable that most of the theorists wasted no time worrying about it): First, our governments might fail to recognize the new "reality" and thereby in one way or another stumble into a war of nuclear annihilation. This peril, though deadly enough, seemed then and seems now unlikely. Second, from false economy or an inadequate grasp of the nature of the challenge of "parity," our governments might fail to provide the military weapons and forces appropriate to less than total war, and thereby place themselves in a position of having to yield to our adversary on issues of conflict that cannot be directly related to the question of our survival. Third, there was the possibility that with the specter of nuclear annihilation hanging over us we, the people, might become paralyzed with terror.

It is these two latter perils that bear particular examination in connection with the subject of "disengagement." Some aspects of the problem, particularly the relation of "defense" and "deterrence," cannot be more than touched upon here. There are those, notably the Wilson-Radford group in this country, now happily out of office, but unfortunately also the President himself about half the time, who cling stubbornly to the hope that the threat of nuclear retaliation—the "psychological shadow" of thermonuclear war—will deter the enemy at least from any *military* action that we choose to designate as unacceptable to us. They point out, with unfortunate justification, that any deviation from this high line, indeed the mere suggestion that our military retaliation might be limited, tends to depreciate our "deterrence" and thus makes "aggression" more probable.

As against this austere line, the proponents of a more cautious strategy, one that accepts *limited* war both as possible and as something which it is to our advantage to be prepared for (because the "psychological shadows" cast by our preparations for limited war are not so likely to paralyze *us*), surely need only cite "Kennanism" as an example of the inevitable consequences of preoccupation with the "psychological shadows" of thermonuclear war. Indeed, they may cite George Kennan himself as one who, having lost faith in the possibility of limiting war, at least in Europe, is now caught in a dilemma of his own making, the only escape from which he finds in the hope that the Russians are at least as nervous about the prospects of nuclear war as he is.

GEORGE F. KENNAN is the scholarly ex-foreign service officer whose writings have done much to make *Realpolitik*—power politics in international relations—intellectually respectable in this country. Before he became a proponent of "disengagement" he was known for his urbane but hard-headed attack upon the "legalistic-moralistic" illusions that had stultified US foreign policy up to World War II. As the author of the famous "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947 he has also received wide credit as the author of the US policy of "containing" the expansion of Russian Communism. We can ask no better starting point for an examination of the proposals for a policy of "disengagement" in Central Europe than his proposition that "armaments are important not just for what could be done with them in time of war, but for *the psychological shadows they cast in time of peace.*"

"Disengagement" is a proposal that has been advanced in a variety of forms. All, however, have in common the major feature that they advocate the withdrawal of US, British and other foreign military forces from the territory of the German Federal Republic in compensation for the withdrawal of Russian forces from East Germany, to be followed by the neutralization and mutual guarantee of a reunited Germany. The terms for German reunification, and the question whether Russian

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forces must also be withdrawn from other of the satellite areas of Eastern Europe, vary as between the proposals.

As for Mr. Kennan's own case for disengagement, which he presented in a lecture series on the BBC networks last November and December, it rests squarely upon his conviction that the only "psychological shadows" cast by NATO military forces in time of peace are the shadows of the thermonuclear war. A local conventional (*i.e.* non-nuclear) defense of NATO in Europe he assumes to be impossible "at least so far as the great nuclear powers are concerned" because the "so-called tactical atomic weapon is now being introduced into the armed forces of the United States and there is the intention . . . to introduce it into Great Britain." Moreover, he "cannot accept" the thesis that "warfare can be restricted to whatever the tactical weapon implies; and that in this way the more apocalyptic effects of nuclear warfare may be avoided."

NATO, then, in its military aspects, is for Kennan primarily a US-British (but mainly US) guarantee to retaliate with thermonuclear weapons upon the Russians in the event they make an all-out attack upon Western Europe. But the prospect of such an attack, he insists, is unreal anyway, it is an "obsession" of statesmen like Mr. Acheson and Mr. Dulles:

> We must get over this obsession that the Russians are yearning to attack and occupy Western Europe, and that this is the principal danger. The Soviet threat, as I have had occasion to say before, is a combined military and political threat, with the accent on the political. If the armed forces of the United States and Britain were not present on the Continent, the problem of defense for the continental nations would be primarily one of the internal health and discipline of the respective national societies, and of the manner in which they were organized to prevent the conquest and subjugation of their national life by unscrupulous and foreign-inspired minorities in their midst. What they need is a strategic doctrine addressed to this reality.

Such a doctrine, he suggests, would assume that the local defense problem of Western Europe is primarily "on the front of police realities." What the European NATO countries require, then, are "paramilitary" forces "of a territorial-militia type . . . rather than regular military units on the World War II pattern. The training of such forces," Mr. Kennan said,

> ought to be such as to prepare them not only to offer *whatever overt resistance might be possible to a foreign invader* but also to constitute *the core of a civil resistance movement on any territory that might be overrun by an enemy.* (Italics added.)

Mr. Kennan goes on from this to his extraordinary and by now famous "personal assurance" that any European country thus prepared to defend itself "at every village crossroads," if it also can assure the Russian invader that "not a single Communist or other person likely to perform your political business will be available to you for this purpose . . . will have little need of foreign garrisons to assure its immunity from Soviet attack."

What, then, is the meaning of the US-British guarantee of NATO? One British critic has already noted the logical conclusion of Mr. Kennan's thinking, "that if the Soviet Union were to violate a disengagement pact by renewed military intervention in the affairs of other European countries, these countries must be left to their fate." (G. F. Hudson in *Commentary,* March, 1958.) There is surely a clear implication that the psychological shadow of thermonuclear war is so appalling that we must not think of using nuclear weapons except to defend ourselves against an attack made with them directly upon us, leaving the Europeans the anemic shadows of their paramilitary forces as their sole military defense.

Mr. Kennan does not state this conclusion explicitly, and, indeed, some of the things he said can be cited against it. Nevertheless, it is not an unreasonable inference from the general tone of his lectures, and from passages such as the following:

> . . . the weapon of mass destruction is a sterile and hopeless weapon which may for a time serve as an answer of sorts to itself and as an uncertain sort of shield against utter cataclysm, but which cannot in any way serve the purposes of a constructive and helpful foreign policy. The true end of political action is, after all, to affect the deeper convictions of men; this the atomic bomb cannot do. The suicidal nature of this weapon renders it unsuitable both as a sanction of diplomacy and as the basis of an alliance.

One is tempted to conclude, despite what he sometimes says to the contrary, that Mr. Kennan regards NATO, the military alliance, less as a contribution to the stability of the world and thus a protection to the West, than as a provocation to the Russians, and hence a source of instability to the world and of danger to the West. Certainly this is not only what he thinks but also what he says about West Germany's part in NATO.

The Kremlin, he says, cannot be expected to withdraw from "the military and political bastion in Central Europe which it won by its military effort from 1941 to 1945" without "compensatory withdrawal of American armed power from the heart of the Continent." But, he adds:

> NATO's real strength does not lie in the *paper undertakings* that underpin it; it lies—and will continue in any circumstances to lie—in the appreciation of the member nations for the identity of their real interests as members of *the Western spiritual and cultural community.* If this appreciation is there, NATO will not be weaker, *as a political reality,* just because it may be supplemented or replaced by other arrangements so far as Germany is concerned. (Italics added.)

It may be difficult to credit his belief that NATO will

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not be made weaker "as a political reality" by the denial to Germany of membership in the "Western spiritual and cultural community," though this seems to be implied by the "other arrangements so far as Germany is concerned." But it is clear enough why American forces can be withdrawn and why the actual and potential military strength of 50 million Germans with the strongest economy on the continent of Europe can be dispensed with, if the only NATO military reality that is not a "paper undertaking" is the shadow of thermonuclear war.

Indeed, it may follow that Germany's military strength is something that *must* be got rid of, if its sole effect is to darken that shadow.

Are there, then, some "psychological shadows" cast by our own armaments that we cannot ourselves endure? And if our adversary will not meet us half way to dispel them, must we dispel them by our own unilateral action? Kennan does not go so far. He does say that we must, with infinite patience, explore Moscow's willingness to meet us half way, not that our cause in the Cold War may prosper, but solely to reduce the danger of the kind of war that is, he repeatedly suggests, the only alternative to a relaxation of tensions.

And why need we take this danger so seriously? Why, because of the "extremely precarious situation" in central Europe, which is "dangerous and unsatisfactory *from everyone's standpoint.*" (Italics added.) Why is it dangerous and unsatisfactory? Because

> there must either be further violent efforts by the people in that area to take things into their own hands and to achieve independence by their own means, or there must be the beginning of some process of real adjustment to the fact of Soviet domination. In the first of these contingencies, we in the West could easily be placed once more before the dilemma which faced us last year at the time of the Hungarian uprising; and anyone who has the faintest concern for the stability of the world situation must fervently pray that this will not happen. . . . As for the second alternative, *which at this moment seems to be the more likely of the two*, it seems no less appalling. (Italics added.)

Yes, Mr. Kennan, the situation is disturbing—to the West. But where is your evidence, what are your arguments, to prove that it is equally disturbing to the Russians? Surely President Eisenhower's assurance to the Kremlin at the time of the Hungarian uprising that Western intervention was unthinkable must have gone far to allay *that* particular concern on their part. And "the beginning of some process of real adjustment" of the satellites "to the fact of Soviet domination" is anything but appalling to the Kremlin, though that, Mr. Kennan, is what you say is "the more likely of the two" contingencies.

In his speech at Minsk on January 25, Nikita Khrushchev said quite pointedly:

> We have declared and declare now that we do not intend to meet for the discussion either of the question of the people's democracies or of the German question as raised by Mr. Eisenhower, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Adenauer. On those issues our position is clear.

It is also true that Mr. Khrushchev said:

> We also believe that it is high time to reach agreement on the reduction of the foreign troops stationed in Germany and other European states. When we speak of the reduction of these forces, we mean that this must be only the beginning, only the first stage, because eventually all foreign troops must be withdrawn from the territories of other countries.

Are we to conclude that the Russians are just as concerned about the dangers of nuclear war implicit in the possibility of a clash in Central Europe as Mr. Kennan professes to be? Or is Khrushchev's offer of "disengagement" just a trap? And how much are we willing to pay to find out?

It is, of course, only an idiot who is *not* afraid of nuclear war. It is only an idiot who does not recognize the peril of nuclear war that lies in *any* use of military force now that nuclear parity is upon us. But—to quote Mr. Kennan again—"Force is, and always will be, an indispensable ingredient in human affairs." It is, then, only an idiot too—or a saint—who does not recognize that if we, afraid as we must be, are *more* afraid of nuclear war than are the Communists, then the only possible outcome of nuclear parity must be our progressive abandonment of those of our marginal interests that are opposed by Communism—unless, indeed, we can count upon the Kremlin being equally intimidated by the "psychological shadows" of thermonuclear war.

But, considering how little the Communist world was intimidated by our nuclear monopoly when they undertook to drive us out of Berlin, or later, by our unquestioned nuclear predominance when they challenged us in Korea and wrested half of Vietnam from the non-Communist world, this seems a very doubtful possibility upon which to rely. It hardly needs emphasizing that Mr. Khrushchev has not lately been conducting himself in such a way as to indicate that the Kremlin is intimidated or nervous; quite the contrary, he has been voicing a newfound confidence. It should not surprise us that he should mouth phrases and sentiments designed to feed Western anxieties and to divide the US from our allies. He is, indeed, only inviting us to assume the secondary and ultimately dependent position that is our just due if our fortitude wavers. He suggests that we liquidate the Cold War in his favor, sacrifice NATO to the end of "relaxing tensions," and abandon our overseas bases as the price of his agreement to the joint control of "cosmic space," leaving him free to gain "peace-loving" dominion over the entire Eurasian continent, while we find whatever security we can in Fortress

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America and the hydrogen bombs that we dare not use.

Even so, the logic of nuclear terror is so persuasive that it must surprise no one to find large numbers of people willing to believe the Russians when they talk about "disengagement," about terminating the arms race, and about liquidating the Cold War. This hope must surely have stirred in the minds of millions of the Britons who heard Mr. Kennan's lectures. Moreover, given the obscurity of his argument as a whole, in contrast with the clarity and emotional force of separate passages, it is inevitable that a good part of his effect upon his audience must have resulted from what he had to say about the future consequences of current official policies. For example, in the fourth lecture he had this to say about the weapons race and the search for defenses against nuclear attack:

> If I thought that this was the best the future held for us, I should be tempted to join those who say, "Let us divest ourselves of this weapon altogether; let us stake our safety in God's grace and our own good consciences and on that measure of common sense and humanity which even our adversaries possess; but then let us at least walk like men, with our heads up, so long as we are permitted to walk at all."

And another time he said:

> I can think of *no greater risk* than the trend toward nuclear war on which we are all now being carried. (Italics added.)

The impact of Mr. Kennan's lectures immediately made itself felt, and not in Britain alone. The opposition party in the German Federal Republic, for example, and even elements of the majority, found encouragement in his ideas for their own misgivings about official policy. A Scandinavian Prime Minister quoted Mr. Kennan to President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles at the Paris NATO "Summit" meeting in December. Nor has the impact of his argument yet begun to wane. Not very long ago an opinion poll in Britain indicated an incredible 72 percent of the British population sampled could identify George Kennan and give some indication of the content of his lectures.

Of course, those European individuals and groups who were most moved by Mr. Kennan's words were but finding in them confirmation, the more precious because it came from an American, for things they had been saying among themselves, at least since October. Some few of these have since adopted the full pacifist answer: nuclear weapons are too horrible to be possessed and used even if they are used against us. It is not these, however, who interest us so much as what looks like a clear majority in Britain, perhaps also in Germany and elsewhere, who are demanding that their governments (and ours) meet the Russians at the Summit to find out whether they really mean what they have said.

It is quite true, as Mr. Richard Lowenthal pointed out awhile ago in a communication to this journal upbraiding it for what he considered injustices to Mr. Kennan, that nowhere in his lectures did the latter explicitly hold out any prospect that the Cold War might be liquidated by a display of "good faith" on the part of the West. Passages can, in fact, be cited to the contrary, notably the one placed at the head of this article. But is it surprising—to take Britain alone—that many in an audience of millions, remembering, as Churchill told them some years ago, that Britain is indefensible in a nuclear war, and becoming convinced that the American nuclear guarantee is neither valid nor desired, should have seized upon some of the things Mr. Kennan *did* say, and should have given them the necessary twist to make them come out in just this wishfulfilling way? For what *did* he say but that the crux of the danger is military and territorial, and that "the German question . . . *stands at the center of world tensions?*" (Italics added.) And what then *is* implied by the proposal that Germany be unified on terms the Russians will accept, and then be neutralized outside the North Atlantic Community, but the possibility that the removal of this focal center of tensions will *demilitarize* the Cold War, leaving it "real" perhaps, but far less terrifying; as Mr. Kennan describes it: a "real competition . . . to see which of us moves most rapidly and successfully to the solution of his own particular problems, and to the fulfillment of his own peculiar ideals."

THERE can be no doubt that much of the vigor with which Mr. Kennan's lectures have been attacked in some quarters, for example by Mr. Acheson and the American Council on Germany in New York, springs from a feeling of irritation—approaching outrage—that so influential a spokesman of American thinking and experience in foreign policy should have permitted himself to say things that would encourage the fears of the people, just at this moment of rude awakening when the West needs all the fortitude it can muster against the Kremlin's new-found boldness.

We must not exaggerate Mr. Kennan's influence, however. Responsibility for the vogue of Kennanism lies more with Mr. Kennan's government than with Mr. Kennan. For it is the defense policies for the nuclear age adopted by our government (all too eagerly followed by the British Government) that, relying as they do upon the deterrent effect of threatened nuclear retaliation, have made it a fact, and no figment of Mr. Kennan's imagination, that the psychological shadows cast by NATO armaments today are too largely the shadows of thermonuclear war.

*In the second part of this article, Mr. King will discuss the disengagement proposal made recently in this journal by Mr. Denis Healey.*

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# BOOKS & COMMENT

## *To Test or Not to Test . . .*

*by William F. Neuman*

"THE PEOPLE are the real power in a democracy. It is of the utmost importance that they should be honestly and completely informed about all relevant facts concerning nuclear energy. When this has been done, the right decisions will be reached on how to use this great power for maintaining peace and improving our lives" . . . from the paper jacket on *Our Nuclear Future* by Edward Teller and Albert Latter.

Who in America could argue with that statement? Or, with these? "The real source of important decisions in our country is the people. We believe that this is rightly so, and we believe that it is not proper if scientists take over any essential part of these decisions." "The responsibility of a technical man . . . includes two important functions. One is to explore nature. . . . The other is to explain what he has found in clear, simple, and straightforward terms . . ." Here, in the first chapter, are beautifully stated views and beliefs which are above reproach. It makes one look forward with relish to the rest of the book. How refreshing, after all of the partisan conflict and scientific controversy, to get the real story on this "nuclear business" from experts who are so obviously sincere.

*Our Nuclear Future*, by Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter (Criterion; $3.50).

For the next nine chapters, the authors live up to the implied promise of the first. The presentation is candid and factual. Of course, the subject matter is elementary nuclear physics and, at the lay level, there is hardly a topic less controversial. Nonetheless, painstaking care was exercised to present in simplest terms the *sense* of nuclear structure, nuclear energetics, the origin of fallout, and the basis of the action of radioactivity on matter. The authors have done a fine job of "translation" from scientific jargon and it seems they have avoided the principal danger, oversimplification. Whether all this is intelligible to the lay reader is beyond me, but if it is not the lay reader is a lost cause.

For ten chapters, then, the authors stick to their guns. In accordance with their great faith in democracy, they inform candidly and honestly. Gradually, however, the tone of the book changes. The authors shift from their avowed aim of *informing* to their real aim, that of *selling* the public on the continuance of nuclear weapons tests. The reader has to be on the alert, for though the textlike, patronizing style is continued, facts gradually give way to unqualified statements as the chapters become more persuasive. Chapter XV, *What About Future Tests*, is a pure propaganda-piece. It is as though the authors, believing that the public will make the right decisions, are plagued by small doubts and want to make sure nothing goes wrong.

Although the authors are theoretical physicists, they present a reasonably accurate account of the ecological and biological aspects of the fallout problem. True, their aim is to minimize the hazards, but they do present the uncertainties in an honest fashion as the following quotations bear witness: "The statistics in all these cases lead to the same conclusion: that large doses of radiation increase the likelihood that an individual's life will be shortened by leukemia and possibly also other cancers. Furthermore, it appears (mainly from experiments on animals) that the increased likelihood is simply proportional to the amount of radiation received, at least for doses in the neighborhood of several hundred roentgens or so." "Per megaton of fission, therefore, perhaps 200 persons may get leukemia or bone cancer. This figure could actually be higher, possibly even a thousand or more persons per megaton." "From past tests (June, 1957), which have involved about 50 megatons of fission energy, the possibility exists that . . . 10,000 cases may occur." "The possible shortening of ten thousand lives may seem rather ominous. . . ." Indeed! But, the authors then make light of these possible deaths by comparing fall-out with other possible causes of life-shortening. As though life and death were a *relative* matter! If we were to accept this reasoning, we should not concern ourselves over murder, because after all, the average shortening of life span in America resulting from first degree murder, like that from fallout, is statistically "negligible."

WE MUST, however, grant this point: relative to other causes of life-shortening, the hazards from fallout are small. The facts of the matter support this conclusion even though some of the evidence so eagerly marshalled by Teller and Latter is worthless, *i.e.* the comparison of incidences of leukemia and bone cancer between Denver and New Orleans and San Francisco (ask any epidemiologist); remarks on the unstudied incidence of mutations in Tibet and Peru (ask any geneticist). But if the hazards are now relatively small, what of the future?

The book states: "The objection may be raised that the fallout, while not dangerous, may become more so as more nations develop and test atomic weapons. On this point we can only say that the future is not easy to predict." "It is hard to make predictions about the plans of all nations." Indeed, it is, but our intrepid authors, undaunted by such problems, *do* predict that the world's testing rate will not increase. This is in terms of fission yield, not total explosive power. "Cleaner" weapons, they explain will make this possible. Possible, yes, but it's anybody's guess.

Even if the reader accepts this optimistic prediction, he will have on his conscience, by the author's own calculations, some two thousand cases of possible cancer per year for as long as the testing program shall continue. This seems like a great moral wrong, but Teller and Latter are right. In these dark days, we must be practical. Granted that it is morally outrageous for any small group of nations to pollute the atmospheres of all nations with cancerogenic fallout, might it not be even

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a greater moral wrong to let freedom die in the face of advancing Communism? If continued nuclear testing were the only alternative to outright submission to Communism, who could argue, who could complain about a few thousand cases of leukemia? But is this not a monstrous oversimplification? This hardly does credit to a creative, imaginative mind such as we've learned to attribute to Teller.

Chapter XV makes three points:

a) disarmament is sure to cause war.
b) nuclear tests cannot be detected.
c) further tests are needed to develop tactical weapons and to develop "cleaner" weapons.

All three points are presented as though they were absolute, incontrovertible truths, yet a moment's reflection reveals that all are relative and more or less meaningless without a frame of reference. Let us consider each point in turn.

History tells us that it is an armaments race, not disarmament, which invariably ends in war. True enough, *unilateral* disarmament of one of two contending nations is certain to lead to conflict, but who in America is advocating *unilateral* disarmament? International control of weapons tests cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be construed to mean unilateral disarmament, yet Chapter XV very cleverly equates the two: "If we renounce nuclear weapons, we open the door to aggression."

THE AUTHORS would have us believe that atomic tests cannot be detected. From the few peeks we've had beneath the shroud of secrecy surrounding this topic, it's difficult to know the truth of the matter. It seems that all important Russian air bursts have been detected in the absence of an international inspection system. Our own underground test of a 1.7 kiloton device (very tiny as nuclear weapons go) was seismographically detectable over 2,000 miles away. From this it follows that, with great effort, *certain* tests might be designed to escape detection, provided the detection system were a casual one. In the words of Willard Libby, giving testimony to Congress as Acting Chairman of AEC: "On the technical matter of whether you could develop a system to enforce a test ban, I think you could do this. You can develop a system which is good enough. It is a more difficult job than some people have indicated. . . ."

The final point that is raised is that specific needs of our armed services must be met by continued tests, *i.e.*, the development of tactical designs, defensive weapons, and "clean" weapons. Here, again, it is a relative matter. Even if we say to hell with morality, continued uncontrolled testing is justifiable only if it benefits the free world more than it benefits the Communist world. Has it done so in the past? Once, we had an atomic monopoly; then, the advantage of the H-bomb. Despite all *our* testing, these advantages have slipped away and, from all appearances, the *rate* of progress of the Russians seems to be greater than ours. Uncontrolled testing on our part insures the Russians a free hand in their own development of nuclear devices. In view of Sputnik, who can say dogmatically that this works to our advantage? Is it not to our advantage to retard further development on both sides before the Russians outstrip us in weapons as they have in missiles?

This, of course, does not answer the matter of defensive weapons. Here we must recognize that in an arms race, defense automatically lags behind offense. One can't design the defense before one knows exactly what one is defending against. Witness the pathetic example paraded for our view by Teller and Latter. They proudly cite the recent development of a fighter-borne nuclear device to blast down incoming bombers. Are we to believe this is our defense against the Russian ICBM? As to "clean" weapons, these will prove advantageous to our side only if the other side is too ashamed of their "dirty" ones to use them. I wouldn't count on it.

There is also a lot of confused nonsense in this chapter which purports to reassure us that cities won't be bombed in future wars. Global wars, limited engagements, and "brush-fire" conflicts are all mixed up in one big pot and the strategies dished out to suit the purposes of the book's arguments. These arguments are so self-defeating that only a few questions seem pertinent. Just what are the targets now assigned to our Strategic Air Command, if they are not Russian cities? In counter-retaliation, just what targets will the Russians choose, if not our cities? The book speaks of troop concentrations being the sole targets. Just what troop concentrations do we have that make logical targets for Russian ICBM's? Here, the authors have rationalized themselves out of all contact with reality.

There may be a case for continued uncontrolled testing of nuclear devices, but it has yet to be made. So many issues are involved, so many conditional problems are unresolved, it is difficult to comprehend how anyone can be dogmatic about nuclear tests. Only from religious conviction or from emotional confusion, can any man say today, "I am unalterably against (or for) continued tests." Which, we wonder, applies to Teller and Latter? Tests are clearly immoral, are clearly hazardous (though not frighteningly so), and are instrumental in increasing the likelihood of global conflict because they serve to increase the pace of a fantastic arms race. For these reasons, all good men can hope that our elected government will show the good sense to strive to bring these tests under an international control with adequate safeguards.

The world today needs a program of action, of workable ideas by which the march toward near-global suicide can be

## *The Best Minds of* What *Bloody Generation*

IN KEROUAC did Ginsberg sing
While Rexroth served as pitchman.
They'd like for all of us to know
They bear the world's unwanted woe
But, then, they like to bitch, man.

The Renaissance at City Lights
At last has made the slicks, bud.
Yet what are they or it to me?
You see, I've never been on tea
Nor had a morning fix, bud.

San Francisco's mansion is
Supplied with many rooms, sir.
So pass the howling poets by,
Give seafood on the Wharf a try,
Have ice cream, then, at Blum's, sir.

GERALD WEALES

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averted. *Our Nuclear Future* does not offer such a program. It does not even give a good case for continued nuclear tests. Rather, it asks the public's consent to a program based on a philosophy of inaction epitomized in this remarkable thought, "The announced policy of our country is to maintain peace and stability in the world. *By being patient* and prepared we are trying *to arrive* [italics ours] at a world order based on law and justice for all peoples."

Just build bombs and be patient, brother. That's all there is to it.

That *is* all there is to it . . . the message of the book, I mean. And, this, after such a fine build-up in the first chapter!

# *Dostoevsky and the Soviets*

## *by Joseph Frank*

VLADIMIR SEDURO'S new book on Dostoevsky in Russian literary criticism is likely to be of interest both to students of Russian literary history as well as to those interested in the minutiae of Communist cultural censorship.

For the first group of readers, Prof. Seduro offers a very useful survey of Russian critical opinion and a valuable bibliography. For the second, he traces the tortured efforts of the Communists to assimilate the intractable Dostoevsky.

*Dostoyevsky in Russian Literary Criticism, 1846-1956,* by Vladimir Seduro (Columbia; $7.50).

Although one of the chief glories of Russian literature, Dostoevsky was also one of the most bitter and penetrating critics of the spiritual fathers of the present Russian regime. These spiritual fathers are not Marx, Engels and Lenin, as the outside world still has a tendency to think, but a whole host of lesser known figures who make up the greater part of the Soviet Russian cultural heritage. Some of Dostoevsky's greatest works (notably *Notes from Underground, Crime and Punishment* and *The Possessed*) contain marvellously incisive and imaginative criticism of the ideals cherished by these Russian radicals of the 19th Century; and the Communist problem with Dostoevsky is an obvious one. Seduro was once Professor of Literature at the University of Minsk and a member of the Association of Soviet Writers. He is thus in a position to give us an inside picture of Soviet attempts to cope with this dilemma.

Dostoevsky, indeed, posed a problem for the Russian radicals long before Stalin and Zhdanov. The first part of Seduro's book is devoted to tracing the reactions of Russian criticism to Dostoevsky from his earliest publications. His first book, *Poor Folk,* was hailed in 1845 as the first Russian social novel; but this enthusiasm cooled when, instead of sticking to social themes, Dostoevsky began to experiment in short stories with the moral-psychological themes of egoism and guilt. Dostoevsky then dropped out of Russian literary life for ten years and served a sentence in Siberia for his part in an abortive political conspiracy. When he returned, he found that radical criticism had become even more intransigent in its determination to measure all literature by political standards; and he promptly engaged in polemics with the famous radical critic, Dobrolyubov. Despite this disagreement, Dobrolyubov made an attempt to enlist Dostoevsky in the radical camp by writing the first important essay on his work, *Forgotten People* (1861).

Dobrolyubov interpreted all of Dostoevsky's early work (not only *Poor Folk*) as a defense of the psychologically humiliated "insulted and injured," oppressed by social injustice. He thus implicitly showed that, despite Dostoevsky's objection to socio-political criticism, the chief significance of Dostoevsky's own best work was largely social.

To make his point, however, Dobrolyubov had to give a very one-sided interpretation of Dostoevsky's writings, which, after *Poor Folk,* can hardly be considered only in the light of a social protest. But Dobrolyubov's essay still serves as a guide for Soviet critics to separate the "good" from the "bad" elements in Dostoevsky's work; and Seduro himself values Dobrolyubov's essay very highly. Its obvious attempt to exploit Dostoevsky's work for polemical purposes, however, should have led him to take it with a few grains of salt.

Seduro is equally incautious when he comes to deal with the controversy that broke out over *Crime and Punishment.* By this time (1867), Dostoevsky's opposition to the radicals was too blatant to be overlooked. Indeed, *Crime and Punishment* is a deadly attack on the glorification of amorality and the will-to-power that had begun to appear in the essays of Dimitri Pisarev, the most influential left-wing Russian critic of the mid-1860's. It is no accident that the next important essay on Dostoevsky is the study of *Crime and Punishment* by Pisarev; and here again the approach of the critic is inspired by an obvious polemical intention. Pisarev wishes to prove, in the teeth of Dostoevsky's clear artistic purpose that Russian society is to blame for Raskolnikov and not the influence of left-wing Nihilist ideas. Prof. Seduro completely overlooks this motive of Pisarev's essay, and he incomprehensibly considers Pisarev's misreading a "magnificent treatment" of the book.

Seduro's handling of early and mid-19th Century criticism is thus not as discerning, as it might be. Moreover, the attention he devotes to later 19th Century criticism is far too perfunctory.

TO MAKE UP for the weaknesses in the first part of his book, Seduro's treatment of Russian criticism since the Revolution is complete, accurate and illuminating. A good deal of first-rate work on Dostoevsky was done in the immediate pre- and post-revolutionary periods.

Curiously enough, the dominant school of Russian criticism in the early 1920's was, like the more recent New Criticism in the United States, concerned largely with formal esthetic problems; and a number of excellent works on Dostoevsky from this point of view appeared under Soviet auspices at this time. Most of the Dostoevsky activity, however, went into the extremely valuable publication of original manuscript material, or into such scholarly work as the study of Dostoevsky sources. No really large-scale critical re-evaluation of Dostoevsky was possible under Soviet

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conditions. And, though Seduro does not mention the fact, the best study of Dostoevsky's life and work in Russian since the Revolution was published in Paris in 1947 by a white Russian exile (Konstantin Mochulsky).

Up through the early 1930's, Russian Dostoevsky scholars were allowed to carry on their researches in comparative serenity. Seduro attributes this relative freedom to the influence of both Maxim Gorky and Anatole Lunacharsky. Even while combatting Dostoevsky's spiritual influence, Gorky never ceased to praise his enormous creative power and artistic importance. Lunacharsky had argued in 1908 that Socialism was really a new religion, and had been sharply rapped over the knuckles by Lenin for such talk; but he became Commissar of Education after the revolution nonetheless, and the problem of Dostoevsky never ceased to fascinate him until his death.

After this time, however, the pressure of Stalinism began to make even the purely objective publication of source material difficult. The third volume of the monumental edition of Dostoevsky's letters, for example, was published in 1934; but the fourth and final volume has never appeared. During the Second World War Dostoevsky briefly returned to favor for patriotic reasons: his passionate nationalism could easily be exploited for propaganda purposes. But in 1947, the war-time attempt to rehabilitate Dostoevsky was nipped in the bud; and Seduro gives amusing examples of Party hacks saying the very opposite about Dostoevsky in 1947 of what they had said in 1946.

SINCE de-Stalinization, the pressure on Dostoevsky research appears to have eased considerably. A new 10-volume edition of his works is now in the course of publication, while the issuance of notebooks, manuscripts and papers has also been announced in the volumes of the yearbook, *Literary Heritage*. All this is a welcome sign that Russian Dostoevsky scholars will be allowed to carry on their work. But recent critical studies continue to re-hash the old banalities about Dostoevsky's "lower-middle class obscurantism," and his "lack of faith in man." For the time being, it is clear that little can be expected in the way of independent insight and fresh evaluation from Soviet Russian pens.

## MUSIC

# *Bang the Drum Slowly*

IN his essay this week Mr. Getlein mentions the considerable amount of good painting going on outside New York. During the past 20-odd years, of course, The Sticks have pretty well disappeared, and throughout the country there is excellent work going on in all the arts. I should like to go on and say that this is "important" work, but (at least in music) it is rarely important except to the people immediately involved in getting it produced. For unless a new piece of music is recorded commercially or given a network broadcast, the means of giving it any kind of large-scale circulation are almost as primitive and cumbersome as they were two hundred years ago. True, it is now possible to use cheap photographic processes to make copies of unpublished manuscripts, but facsimiles of this sort are of little use or interest to the public at large. The result is an extreme provincialism; by common consent, important New York premieres are important to the musical community at large. Premieres in Boston, Detroit, San Francisco, Washington, etc., are not important—unless they are "newsworthy."

And when does a piece of music become news? During the past few years, there have been Washington premieres of important works by such well-known figures as Hindemith, Stravinsky and Menotti—yet none of these pieces came to any kind of general attention until they had been performed in New York or in some European capital. Actually, Washington is one of the best towns for contemporary music in the country, and hardly a week goes by during the season without some first performances; but interest in them is pretty well confined to the District of Columbia and neighboring counties.

Of the fairly large group of Washington modernist composers, only one—Robert Parris—has contrived to arouse popular national interest, and he has done that just within the past week for his Concerto for Five Kettle Drums and Orchestra, introduced in Washington by Howard Mitchell and the National Symphony.

The wire services and magazines were interested in this piece before it was played—and I hope it isn't ungracious to point out that they smelled a novelty, a musical freak that would make good copy whether the piece was any good or not. In his review, Day Thorpe, the critic of the *Washington Star*, pointed out that Parris is "a respected and controversial figure to those who take their music seriously," and this is perfectly true—within a 20-mile radius of the White House. But the idea that the piece might be important simply because it was good was certainly not uppermost in the mind of anybody in the national news-services.

I was the only critic in attendance who was not surprised by anything in the score, for the reason that I had assisted in proof-reading the parts and also had attended the rehearsals; and this involvement disqualifies me from giving any opinion of it, beyond concurring with the audience and reviewers that, far from being a stunt, it is an extraordinarily well-made piece of music which dexterously combines the elements of a good show with the most exacting standards of technical and imaginative fluency. The composer's problem in it was to follow the line of greatest resistance—to create a tuneful work, classical in structure, in which the melodic substance could be drawn from the limited resources of a few tuned drums. The demands on the virtuosity of the soloist—as well as the composer—are, of course, hair-raising. The drummer—in this case Fred Begun, the young tympani virtuoso for whom the work was composed—is required to cover a compass of more than an octave and a half and, at one point, to retune one drum while playing another—all of which makes for a pleasant spectacle.

As a conscientious composer of substantial accomplishments, there is no question that Parris' success with his piece is deserved and, in fact overdue. But there are questions that come to mind: first, how much will this *coup* do to get more hearings of Parris' large output of excellent chamber works; second, does it take a conception of such startling originality for a young composer to establish himself?

ROBERT EVETT

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## ART

# *The Pennsylvania Branches Out*

FOR its 153rd time out, the Pennsylvania Academy annual has collaborated with the Detroit Institute. The results, now on view in Detroit, are happy. The show is important anyhow, not only because of its great age, but because it is the last of the big national exhibitions to operate with artists only on the juries. The two juries, one for painting, one for sculpture, met in both cities and in New York. The bid and asked figures are interesting.

Painting: New York, 1,502 submitted, 50 accepted; Philadelphia, 1,107 submitted, 42 accepted; Detroit, 566 submitted, 31 accepted. Sculpture: New York, 263 and 11; Philadelphia, 159 and 14; Detroit, 103 and 8.

I offer these market quotations because they seem to bear out something I've believed for some time, that there's a good bit of respectable painting and sculpture going on outside Manhattan. The impression is abroad that this country now has about 25 painters, two of whom live in the Pacific Northwest with the rest in New York. The new structure of the Academy show helps to correct that view. It should be noted, of course, that jury action accounted for just over half the 302 pieces. The rest were by invitation of the two chairmen, who, between them, called on work by 363 artists, of whom 136 were chosen. For the benefit of any lightning mental calculators in the crowd, the other 10 came from Academy faculty members, who traditionally get in ex officio.

The sculpture hall, which is the first entered in Detroit, gives the over-all impression that this is a strongly conservative show. This is not true of the exhibition as a whole, except in the limited usage of "conservative" based on the theory that if you can tell what it is, it's old hat.

In sculpture, though, the human figure dominates, with special emphasis on the female figure. There are some lovely examples and even a few strong ones, but one effect of recent sculpture is to make a lot of good straightforward figure work seem dull, especially when a lot of it is seen at once. Figures of power are Der Harootian's girl bent back over the block she's carved from and the late Saul Baizerman's very sensitive nude back and leg.

Figures of charm and grace are Mary Callery's parade of soft stick men dancing out to meet the sun and Doris Caesar's elegant and elongated tip-toe nude.

A figure of utter nonsense got the top sculpture award, Kahlil Gibran's John the Baptist. If the name is familiar, the style is, too, for this sculpture has the same revolting quality of the *other* Gibran's book, *The Prophet*. It's a figure in round put together with welded short lengths of metal used to imitate cast metal and to create the totally false response that this is pretty advanced stuff. Face and figure are just too sweet for words. A masterpiece of the meretricious.

Passed over for money and medals was easily the best sculpture in the show, Theodore Roszak's tremendous "Skylark," a great soaring dance figure with a head like a 3D starfish; Roszak takes a huge mass of heavy metal and, never concealing the weight, makes it look like gossamer in a gentle breeze.

ALSO first rate in sculpture is Ruth Vodicka's "Song of David," in which open form metal portrays the singer and strongly suggests both the song and the singing. One of the very few metal salvage items on hand is also one of the strongest—Herbert Ferber's "The Sun, the Moon, the Stars," in which all these luminaries are set in flat space bounded by a frame as crudely put together as they are themselves. The effect is of a time early in creation before the rough edges of the universe have been smoothed off. This distinctive feeling is natural to this kind of sculpture yet rarely as fully achieved as here.

The painting section leans heavily on people who were doing top work before it occurred to anyone to throw the paint up for grabs and see what happened.

This rather novel assumption that artists who were good 20 years ago may today be as good or even better is amply justified in the show. Sheeler's "Shaker Theme" intersects the transparent forms of barns and lets his clear cool light dazzle where the planes meet. Max Weber's three old rebs in top hats hauntingly continue the faintly comic yet deeply moving dialogue of line and muted color and a dying but admirable culture he has recorded before. Hopper's transcontinental loneliness is here present in an aging gas station man and his wife leaning out the window along a deserted highway.

Rattner's "Rome No. 4" achieves, as he has been doing steadily for years, the most completely effective synthesis of some of the newer ways of painting with the traditional artist's concern to seek truth and to reveal it to someone else. This latest version of his eternal attack on the eternal city juxtaposes the wolf with Romulus and Remus at the dug and three crosses, bathed in such light that they almost disappear. Between these two central forms, a rich flux of form and paint suggests something of the city's own texture.

Rico Lebrun's study for "Buchenwald Cart" is evidence of seeking a similar synthesis of his own, with one of his own stressed. Heads and feet emerge in livid light from an over-all ominous gloom.

The let-yourself-go school of painting is by no means absent, but Hans Hofmann is the only member whose work looks as well in a mixed show as in one devoted exclusively to abstract expressionism. The old boy's "Circular Shifting" is lyrical and lively with thick blobs and thin strokes chasing themselves endlessly. De Kooning's "Noon" is the only weak painting of his I've ever seen. The manner is there but the savage melody has not lingered on. Marca-Relli's vast paste up of white canvas flaps with thin black oozing through the edges could seem an austere relief in the fiery furnace stoked by the gang; here it is preposterous, as wide as a church door, nowhere near as deep.

FRANK GETLEIN

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### Notes on Contributors

WILLIAM F. NEUMAN, a scientist, is on the faculty of the University of Rochester. JOSEPH FRANK has just completed a critical book on Russian fiction. STANLEY KAUFFMANN has written about movies for numerous periodicals. GERALD WEALES has published a children's book, *Miss Grimsbee is a Witch.*

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## MOVIES

# *Love in Old New England*

THAT great actress, Margaret Anglin, who died recently at eighty-one, told me once the story of her first meeting with Eugene O'Neill. In the mid-nineties she was engaged as the ingenue in the company of James O'Neill, the dramatist's actor-father, and one day after a matinee Mrs. O'Neill came backstage to visit her, bringing young Eugene, aged about seven. The ladies embraced, and then Miss Anglin noticed the boy lingering bashfully in the doorway. "Come in, little boy," she said. "Don't be afraid. I won't kiss you." Young Eugene glowered up from under dark brows and said: "You might."

Gnomic reductions of complicated souls are notoriously unreliable, but the Don Hartman-Paramount film of *Desire*

*Desire Under the Elms*, by Eugene O'Neill (Paramount).

*Under the Elms* recalled that anecdote vividly to mind. There is plenty of kissing in it, without hesitancy; but clearly an inherent fear of joy, a conviction that pleasure must be paid for, haunts the story. The play intends to pluck out the dry demon of puritanism that it may shrivel in the sunlight, but underneath this, one feels a conviction that even this excision will not improve things much. In a quite literal sense, life will always be one damned thing after another.

The story, you will remember, takes place in New England in 1850. (The film, inexplicably, makes it 1840, so that the references to the discovery of gold in California sound odd.) Ephraim Cabot, a gnarled old farmer who is twice a widower, with two sons by his first wife and one by his second, brings home a third wife. On the day she arrives the two older sons leave for California, financed by the youngest son, Eben, who has stolen the money from his father's buried hoard to get rid of them, so that he can inherit the farm alone. The new wife is much younger than her husband; she and her stepson Eben fall in love. Eventually she is delivered of a boy which Ephraim joyously and falsely believes is his. A quarrel between father and son leads to a quarrel between Eben and the wife. He claims she tricked him into making love to her because the old man couldn't and she wanted an heir for the farm. To prove this is untrue, she murders the baby. First, Eben is repelled from her by this; then he returns to stand trial with her for infanticide, to share the moral responsibility.

THIS is strong stuff, but that never daunted O'Neill. In a letter to George Jean Nathan about this play, he wrote: "Its poetical vision illuminating even the most sordid and mean blind alleys of life—that is my justification as a dramatist!" What is curious is that, in spite of its violent materials, the work is now so largely unmoving. There are several reasons for this, I believe, some of them mentioned below, but partly it may be because the American puritan strain against which O'Neill was inveighing has gone underground, as it were, and has taken other forms. The flinty, avaricious New England God-fearer is no longer a symbol for our times; he has been replaced by the advertising man tormented by a sense of wasted life into alcoholism. The transmutation tends to make these O'Neill characters more of historical than emotional interest.

Then, too, the construction of the play after the baby's birth is so contrived that it draws attention to itself. Why should Eben immediately believe his father's story about Anna instead of her version? Why should she keep so stagily silent about her plan to murder the baby? Why, after being revolted by her crime, should Eben change so quickly and come back to accompany her to prison?

However, in spite of these points, this film would affect us more if it were better acted. The best work is done by Sophia Loren as the young wife, who in this version is an Italian, not a New Englander. Miss Loren, breath-stoppingly beautiful, is quite convincing as a woman who has been used harshly by men and who means to be revenged on the world through this marriage but who is confounded by falling in love. Under Delbert Mann's direction, Miss Loren

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gives considerable evidence of development as an actress.

As the two older sons, Frank Overton and Pernell Roberts are fine. Both of these actors are well-known in the theatre: Overton is now performing capably in the new Inge play, and Roberts is remembered for an unconventional but frequently effective Petruchio last year. In this film they give trenchant portrayals with a good sense of period and style.

It is in the two principal male performances that the picture falters badly. Anthony Perkins has by now established unmistakably that he is a young actor of rare and touching talent, but he is miscast here. He lacks the rancor and weight for Eben. His immaturity is especially evident in the love scenes with Miss Loren. I expected her to brush him aside with the back of her hand.

Burl Ives, as Ephraim, attempts to perpetuate the myth that he is an actor. This pleasant folk singer was utilized ingeniously by Elia Kazan in the Broadway production of *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*; by getting Ives to stand still most of the time and, presumably, by spoon-feeding him readings (he has never spoken lines so well since), Kazan was able to use the singer's bulk and presence to give the illusion of force. Less capable directors have not been able to equal Kazan's achievements. In this film Ives' eyes are dead and meaningless throughout, and his voice, as is often the case with a singer's speaking voice, is severely limited in range. His attempts, as Ephraim, to dominate his household are superficial, laid on muscularly; they do not grow out of a genuine actor's powers of creation and projection. Only in the frenetic dance to celebrate his son's birth, where sheer athleticism masks the flaws, does Ives achieve some flavor of this self-appointed protagonist of God, antagonist of man.

IRWIN SHAW's screenplay makes few alterations in the original drama. He brings Ephraim home unexpectedly one day to create suspense in the illicit love affair; he leaves Eben's theft of his father's money undiscovered; he brings back the two older sons from California, rich and married, to gloat over their father. The chief alteration is in making the young wife a foreigner, but "there is example for't." O'Neill himself prepared a screen treatment in which he not only made the wife a Hungarian, he prettied up the story, which Shaw does not.

In fact the screenplay is so good that it illustrates a recurring paradox in recent films made from famous works. This script, like that of *A Farewell to Arms* and (with a few reservations) *The Sun Also Rises*, is a remarkably faithful transcription of its source. These versions are not guilty of what David O. Selznick recently called, in a memorable phrase, "excessive fidelity"; but in the main they do not distort the original author's work, they merely adapt it to another medium. Yet in these pictures the impact of the O'Neill and Hemingway works has been lost.

The chief reason for this is the casting. Every time they speak, Jennifer Jones and Rock Hudson, of *A Farewell to Arms*, destroy not only their own credibility but that of everything that has been built up around them by others. Tyrone Power and Ava Gardner, of *The Sun Also Rises*, will never be anything but movie stars, no matter how earnestly they try to act. In the O'Neill film Anthony Perkins, who needs appropriate roles, and Burl Ives, who needs vocational guidance, fail the script.

BUT in this last picture there is an added reason for failure. This film stands in the same case as, for instance, the film of *Death of a Salesman* presented a few years back. Both of these pictures, though adapted with devotion, were made from plays so intrinsically theatrical that they cannot be successfully rendered in any other medium. Their theatre form is part of their being; film does not liberate them, it dissipates them.

Still, the prime reason for the failure of the Hemingway and O'Neill pictures remains the casting. It is an irony that, as screen adaptations have improved, the economic position of the movies has become so grave that producers must continue to use box-office names in these better scripts, even when they are as wildly incompetent as Rock Hudson. Has Hollywood grown up too late? Producers now take their responsibilities as adapters more seriously, but have movies declined so far in popular favor that they must sacrifice this lately-won seriousness to financial survival?

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

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# *Correspondence*

*(Continued from page 3)*

*Robert* Morris. The difference is substantial. Newbold, a LaGuardia Republican, was—and is—a civic ornament, an eminently useful citizen. What, if anything, Robert ornaments is indeed a question. Ten to one it won't be the United States Senate. *That* much confidence we can have in the Jersey Republican voters.

S.W.G.

*Brooklyn, N. Y.*

### ► *TRB and Sherman Adams*

**The last issue of this journal contained a letter by Rep. Perkins Bass, accusing TRB of unfairness in his treatment of Sherman Adams and Adams' involvement with the FCC scandals. Here is TRB's reply.**

HERE are two instances of Mr. Adams' influence upon the regulatory agencies.

1. J. Sinclair Armstrong, then chairman of the SEC, testifying reluctantly and under oath, told the Kefauver subcommittee that on June 11, 1955 Adams secretly telephoned him, asking postponement of a hearing—at which the dual role of Adolphe Wenzell in the Dixon-Yates case would have been exposed. The House was just about to vote an initial TVA appropriation on a Dixon-Yates power line. As a result of the call the SEC hearing was postponed and the House went on to approve the power line without knowing of the Wenzell affair. The other parties in the SEC matter were not told of Adams' intervention. Adams refused Kefauver's invitation to testify on the matter.

2. The Civil Aeronautics Board has a Code of Ethics which reads in part, "It is improper that there be any private communication on the merits of the case to a member of the Board or its staff or to the examiner in the case by any person either in private or public life unless provided for by law." The Schwartz investigation reveals that Adams in 1953 discussed the status of North American Airlines with the acting chairman of CAB in behalf of the airline's counsel, Murray Chotiner (Nixon's 1952 campaign manager). On White House stationery inscribed "personal and confidential" Adams wrote Chotiner that he had gone over the case "carefully" and discussed the legal aspects. As the *Washington Post* observed, ". . . If the letters mean what they appear to mean, Mr. Adams perpetrated a gross impropriety by intervening with a quasi-judicial agency in an affair that should not have concerned the White House."

Adams is a dedicated supporter of Eisenhower; in fact he sometimes appears to be Eisenhower. Asked about the Adams-CAB incident at a press conference Eisenhower surprisingly said he had never heard of it. He speculated that Adams might have been getting information for him on North American Airlines because it involved foreign air routes. But the nonscheduled line never had foreign routes. When the reporter sought to clear this up the president angrily replied, "I don't want anything more about that."

Eisenhower's ignorance shows the range of Adams' opportunity to operate. TRB does not call Adams dishonest; quite the reverse. He is loyal to his superior, a joyous partisan and zealous of those privileges for business which the regulatory agencies are supposed to circumscribe. He holds amazing delegated power and is neither answerable to Congress nor the voters.

T.R.B.

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